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Second Growth Stands of Douglas-fir

Recent studies by Rudolf F. Grah, Specialist in Forestry, University of California, Berkeley, show the effect of low stand density on quantity and quality of yield.

One of the common problems of modern timber management is that some lands tend to regenerate after cutting with far fewer trees per acre—low stand density—than were in original stands at similar ages.

Data on quantity and quality of yield of Douglas-fir were analyzed to show that, within the range of initial stand densities considered, the net harvestable volume is not significantly affected by stand density. On the other hand, quality as measured by knot size and amount of

excessively fast grown wood was shown to be very greatly affected by density. From an economic viewpoint, stands grown at low initial densities yielded a soil expectation value of \$44 per acre less than those of full density. Three general conclusions are drawn which have application to current management practice: 1. Low initial density reduces financial value of Douglas-fir stands; 2. Fill-in planting and pruning to overcome quality deficiencies are effective and profitable investments; and 3. Stand improvement investments are most profitable on the better sites, and those sites should be given priority in the allocation of funds.

STRAWBERRY

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southern California probably can not be delayed as long as those for Lassen.

The Solana strawberry apparently requires a longer minimum growing period, during the establishment season, if optimum performance is to be realized. Also, Solana probably should be established with stored plants and the plantings made early in the summer, compared to Lassen. Winter planting of Solana is not recommended.

R. S. Bringhurst is Associate Professor of Pomology, University of California, Davis.

Victor Voth is Associate Specialist in Pomology, University of California, Davis, located at the South Coast Field Station, Santa Ana.

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RANGELAND

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CIPC. were used. Residues from such herbicides may be injurious to perennial grass species seeded at a later date unless rapid breakdown of the chemicals occurs. Complete elimination of some resident annual grasses may not be desirable because certain grass species, such as soft chess, provide food forage. However, reduction or elimination of weedy grasses would greatly improve the range, particularly if followed by the introduction of desirable annual clovers or perennial grasses. The effect of applying legume selective herbicides such as EPTC and CIPC not only failed to damage the seeded rose clover but also resulted in a greater cover of native annual legumes.

The promising results of this investigation justify further work on the problem of reducing competition during seedling establishment of annual rangelands by the application of pre-emergence herbicides.

Cyrus M. McKell is Plant Physiologist, Crops Research Division, ARS, USDA, and Associate in Agronomy, University of California, Davis.

Burgess L. Kay is Assistant Specialist in Range Management, University of California, Davis.

Jack Major is Assistant Professor of Botany, University of California, Davis.

POTATOES

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rates above five pounds per acre provided control of broadleafed weeds and grasses for a period of three weeks. NPA and CDAA failed to provide adequate control. This may have been due in part to a rapid leaching of these materials from the upper soil. Yellow nutgrass which was present was not controlled by any of the herbicides tested.

Neburon and CDEC were the only herbicides which provided weed control with no injury to the potatoes at the highest rates used. Simazin caused a reduction in tuber formation at concentrations which fell in the range best suited for weed control. Monuron and diuron, while controlling weeds, left a narrow margin of safety for the crop plant. CDAA and NPA failed to provide adequate control under conditions of the field trials.

Growers Ralph and Robert Broady of Chino cooperated in the field trials.

and higher supports during the past few years. If farmers take full advantage of the allowed acreage, greater surpluses than ever may be in prospect for the immediate future, in spite of reduced price support levels.

The United States gained only about 6% in cotton production and consumption between two five-year periods—from 12.9 million bales produced, and 12.1 million consumed in 1935–1939 to 13.7 and 12.8 million in 1953–1957.

Foreign use of United States cotton declined about 6%—1.0 million bales—but a 29% increase in United States use—2.0 million bales—offset this drop and resulted in a 6% gain in world-wide consumption between the same periods.

The rate of growth in the world cotton market has slowed, and little change has occurred since 1955, although foreign production has tended to expand as United States cotton output contracted.

United States cotton growers lost ground in the world market in the period beginning just before World War II, a disadvantage that is both absolute and relative. The United States is selling less cotton abroad now, in spite of the fact that foreign consumers are using more total cotton. The one major change that has prevented a still worse position for California and United States growers is increased consumption in the domestic market. However, both per capita and total bale consumption in the United States have declined since 1955.

The facts relative to the cotton situation are quite important to California and United States growers as they consider whether to elect Plan A or Plan B for the 1959 and 1960 seasons. At the upper extreme, if all growers chose Plan B and obtained yields equal to those in 1958, the result would be an overwhelming surplus. Plantings might reach about 22,834,000 acres; an average yield of 470 pounds of lint per acre would mean total production at about the 21.5 million bale level. The estimated 1958-59 disappearance—about 12.25 million bales would still leave about 9.5 million bales to add to the August 1, 1959, carryover of 8.7 million. The result would be that carryover into 1960-61 would be over 18 million bales—an unworkable figure that would undo all progress in recent seasons toward working off surpluses.

To be continued

D. C. Purnell is Farm Advisor, San Bernardino County, University of California.

C. D. McCarty is Extension Field Technologist, University of California, Riverside.

T. M. Little is Extension Vegetable Crops Specialist, University of California, Riverside.

Trimble R. Hedges is Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of California,

Douglas D. Caton, Agricultural Economist, United States Department of Agriculture, Davis, collaborated in the research analysis on which this report is based.